

Mental Causation And The Metaphysics Of Mind

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Physicalism and Mental Causation Sven Walter 2015-11-04 Physicalism—the thesis that everything there is in the world, including our minds, is constituted by basic physical entities—has dominated the philosophy of mind during the last few decades. But although the conceptual foundations of the physicalist agenda—including a proper explication of notions such as ‘causation’, ‘determination’, ‘realization’ or even ‘physicalism’ itself—must be settled before more specific problems (e.g. the problems of mental causation and human agency) can be satisfactorily addressed, a comprehensive philosophical reflection on the relationships between the various key concepts of the debate on physicalism is yet missing. This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency, written by established and leading authors in the field.

Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World Terence Horgan 2015-03-05 How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated; and second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind.

Mental Causation Jens Harbecke 2008 This work systematically investigates a range of solutions for the philosophical problem of mental causation. The premises constituting the problem are analyzed, then a survey is developed of the most popular theories on mental causation. Harbecke demonstrates why most of these canonical solutions must be considered deficient. In a third part, the "new compatibilists" approach to mental causation is explored, which is characterized by assertion of a non-identity-but-non-distinctness principle. The last part offers an alternative solution to the problem. On the basis of a certain set of counterfactual conditionals, which are jointly taken to provide a definition of "causal proportionality" that improves the existing definitions, it is shown that a specific, and hitherto widely neglected, version of causal overdeterminationism must be considered the most successful solution to the problem.

Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Mind Neil Campbell 2003

Personal Agency E. J. Lowe 2008-09-04 Lowe defends a common-sense view of ourselves as free agents, capable of bringing about changes in the world through the choices we make, rather than being caused to act as we do by factors external to our will. He demonstrates many weaknesses of the materialist conception of the human mind and its powers that is dominant in Western philosophy.

Physicalism and Mental Causation Sven Walter 2003 This book presents a range of essays on the conceptual foundations of physicalism, mental causation and human agency.

Thoughts Stephen Yablo 2008-11-27 Thoughts is a collection of twelve essays by Stephen Yablo which together constitute a modern-day examination of Cartesian themes in the metaphysics of mind. Yablo offers penetrating discussions of such topics as the relation between the mental and the physical, mental causation, the possibility of disembodied existence, the relation between conceivability and possibility, varieties of necessity, and issues in the theory of content arising out of the foregoing. The collection represents almost all of Yablo's work on these topics, and features one previously unpublished piece.

The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy Jenny Pelletier 2018-01-02 This edited volume presents new lines of research dealing with the language of thought and its philosophical implications in the time of Ockham. It features more than 20 essays that also serve as a tribute to the ground-breaking work of a leading expert in late medieval philosophy: Claude Panaccio. Coverage addresses topics in the philosophy of mind and cognition (externalism, mental causation, resemblance, habits, sensory awareness, the psychology, illusion, representationalism), concepts (universal, transcendental, identity, syncategorematic), logic and language (definitions, syllogisms, modality, supposition, obligations, etc.), action theory (belief, will, action), and more. A distinctive feature of this work is that it brings together contributions in both French and English, the two major research languages today on the main theme in question. It unites the most renowned specialists in the field as well as many of Claude Panaccio's former students who have engaged with his work over the years. In furthering this dialogue, the essays render key topics in fourteenth-century thought accessible to the contemporary philosophical community without being anachronistic or insensitive to the particularities of the medieval context. As a result, this book will appeal to a general population of philosophers and historians of philosophy with an interest in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics.

Human Action, Deliberation and Causation J.A.M Bransen 2012-12-06 There is an interesting and far-reaching disagreement between Smith and Frederick Stoutland. In his 'The Real Reasons' Stoutland argues that one of the mistakes that turned the belief-desire model of action into the 'received view' is the underlying commitment to the idea that there is an underlying unity to all action explanations. According to Stoutland the unity is no deeper than the superficial fact that actions are responses of agents to the world, and the challenge for the philosophy of action is to make sense of that fact without falling victim to the unfruitful assumption that reasons should be understood as the normative content of determinate representational inner states of agents. Stoutland suggests an alternative according to which reasonable agents possess the know how to respond appropriately to the normative import of the external situations they find themselves in. These situations are, Stoutland claims, the real reasons. Stoutland raises an important issue. If beliefs and desires should be understood as reasons, as introducing normative constraints that de serve respect, it seems we are bound to distinguish between on the one hand the content of our beliefs and desires and on the other hand their objects. Moreover, it seems we have good reasons to believe that the content of our beliefs and desires derives its normative import qua normative import from the objects of our beliefs and desires.

Mental Causation Anthony Dardis 2008 Two thousand years ago, Lucretius said that everything is atoms in the void; it's physics all the way down. Contemporary physicalism agrees. But if that's so how can we? how can our thoughts, emotions, our values? make anything happen in the physical world? This conceptual knot, the mental causation problem, is the core of the mind-body problem, closely connected to the problems of free will, consciousness, and intentionality. Anthony Dardis shows how to unravel the knot. He traces its early appearance in the history of philosophical inquiry, specifically in the work of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and T. H. Huxley. He then develops a metaphysical framework for a theory of causation, laws of nature, and the causal relevance of properties. Using this framework, Dardis explains how macro, or higher level, properties can be causally relevant in the same way that microphysical properties are causally relevant: by their relationship with the laws of nature. Smelling an orange, choosing the orange rather than the cheesecake, reaching for the one on the left instead of the one on the right—mental properties such as these take their place alongside the physical "motor of the world" in making things happen.

Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Mind Neil Campbell 2003-01-02 Since Descartes's division of the human subject into mental and physical components in the seventeenth century, there has been a great deal of discussion about how—indeed, whether or not—our mental states bring about our physical behavior. Through historical and contemporary readings, this collection explores this lively and important issue. In four parts, this anthology introduces the problem of mental causation, explores the debate sparked by Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, examines Frank Jackson's knowledge argument for the view that qualia are epiphenomenal, and investigates attempts to employ the controversial concept of supervenience to explain mental causation.

Metaphysics of Mind: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide Darragh Byrne 2010-06-01 This ebook is a selective guide designed to help scholars and students of social work find reliable sources of information by directing them to the best available scholarly materials in whatever form or format they appear from books, chapters, and journal articles to online archives, electronic data sets, and blogs. Written by a leading international authority on the subject, the ebook provides bibliographic information supported

by direct recommendations about which sources to consult and editorial commentary to make it clear how the cited sources are interrelated. This ebook is a static version of an article from Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy, a dynamic, continuously updated, online resource designed to provide authoritative guidance through scholarship and other materials relevant to the study Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online covers most subject disciplines within the social science and humanities, for more information visit www.oxfordbibliographies.com.

Mental Causation John Heil 1995 Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors include Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick.

Mental Causation and Ontology S. C. Gibb 2013-03-21 An international team of contributors presents new work on the importance of ontology for a central debate in philosophy of mind. Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, two widely accepted metaphysical principles—the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal non-overdetermination—which together appear to support reductive physicalism, despite the latter's lack of intuitive appeal. Current debate about these matters appears to have reached something of an impasse, prompting the question of why this should be so. One possibility is that, while this debate makes extensive use of ontological vocabulary—by talking, for instance, of substances, events, states, properties, powers, and relations—relatively little attempt has been made within the debate itself to achieve either clarity or agreement about what, precisely, such terms should be taken to mean. The debate has become somewhat detached from broader developments in metaphysics and ontology, which have lately been proceeding apace, providing us with an increasingly rich and refined set of ontological categories upon which to draw, as well as a much deeper understanding of how they are related to one another. In this volume, leading metaphysicians and philosophers of mind reflect afresh upon the problem of mental causation in the light of some of these recent developments, with a view to making new headway with one of the most challenging and seemingly intractable issues in contemporary philosophy.

The Causal Exclusion Problem Dwayne Moore 2014 In <The Causal Exclusion Problem, the popular strategy of abandoning any one of the principles constituting the causal exclusion problem is considered, but ultimately rejected. The metaphysical foundations undergirding the causal exclusion problem are then explored, revealing that the causal exclusion problem cannot be dislodged by undermining its metaphysical foundations - as some are in the habit of doing. Finally, the significant difficulties associated with the bevy of contemporary nonreductive solutions, from supervenience to emergentism, are expanded upon. While conducting this survey of contemporary options, however, two novel approaches are introduced, both of which may resolve the causal exclusion problem from within a nonreductive physicalist paradigm.<The Causal Exclusion Problem, which relentlessly motivates the vexing causal exclusion problem and exhaustively surveys its metaphysical assumptions and contemporary responses, is ideal for an advanced undergraduate or graduate course in the philosophy of mind.

A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Neil Campbell 2005-01-11 One of the most profound philosophical problems is the nature of mind and its relationship to the body. A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind provides an introduction, written in clear language, to the various theories of the mind-body relationship, as well as a host of related philosophical discussions about mind and consciousness. The central theories, such as Cartesian Dualism, parallelism, epiphenomenalism, and supervenience among others, are presented in historical order. Their claims, their strengths and weaknesses, and how they ultimately relate to one another and to other philosophical questions are explored objectively, allowing readers to decide for themselves which theories are best.

Supervenience and Mind Jaegwon Kim 1993-11-26 This collection of essays presents the core of the work of influential philosopher Jaegwon Kim.

Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation Michele Paolini Paoletti 2017-02-17 Downward causation plays a fundamental role in many theories of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It is strictly connected with many topics in philosophy, including but not limited to: emergence, mental causation, the nature of causation, the nature of causal powers and dispositions, laws of nature, and the possibility of ontological and epistemic reductions. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation brings together experts from different fields—including William Bechtel, Stewart Clark and Tom Lancaster, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Robin F. Hendry, Max Kistler, Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum—who delve into classic and unexplored lines of philosophical inquiry related to downward causation. It critically assesses the possibility of downward causation given different ontological assumptions and explores the connection between downward causation and the metaphysics of causation and dispositions. Finally, it presents different cases of downward causation in empirical fields such as physics, chemistry, biology and the neurosciences. This volume is both a useful introduction and a collection of original contributions on this fascinating and hotly debated philosophical topic.

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough Jaegwon Kim 2007-12-03 Contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind have largely been shaped by physicalism, the doctrine that all phenomena are ultimately physical. Here, Jaegwon Kim presents the most comprehensive and systematic presentation yet of his influential ideas on the mind-body problem. He seeks to determine, after half a century of debate: What kind of (or "how much") physicalism can we lay claim to? He begins by laying out mental causation and consciousness as the two principal challenges to contemporary physicalism. How can minds exercise their causal powers in a physical world? Is a physicalist account of consciousness possible? The book's starting point is the "supervenience" argument (sometimes called the "exclusion" argument), which Kim reformulates in an extended defense. This argument shows that the contemporary physicalist faces a stark choice between reductionism (the idea that mental phenomena are physically reducible) and epiphenomenalism (the view that mental phenomena are causally impotent). Along the way, Kim presents a novel argument showing that Cartesian substance dualism offers no help with mental causation. Mind-body reduction, therefore, is required to save mental causation. But are minds physically reducible? Kim argues that all but one type of mental phenomena are reducible, including intentional mental phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. The apparent exceptions are the intrinsic, felt qualities of conscious experiences ("qualia"). Kim argues, however, that certain relational properties of qualia, in particular their similarities and differences, are behaviorally manifest and hence in principle reducible, and that it is these relational properties of qualia that are central to their cognitive roles. The causal efficacy of qualia, therefore, is not entirely lost. According to Kim, then, while physicalism is not the whole truth, it is the truth near enough.

Metaphysics of Mind Source Wikipedia 2013-09 Please note that the content of this book primarily consists of articles available from Wikipedia or other free sources online. Pages: 64. Chapters: Being John Malkovich, Causal closure, Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, Dualism (philosophy of mind), Eliminative materialism, Emergence, Emergent materialism, Indefinite monism, Mental representation, Metaphysical solipsism, Naive realism, Neutral monism, On the Content and Object of Presentations, Open individualism, Personal identity, Phenomenalism, Physicalism, Problem of mental causation, Property dualism, Pure thought, Reduction (philosophy), Reflexive monism, Revisionary materialism, Self-model theory of subjectivity, Strong emergence, Subjective idealism, Supervenience. Excerpt: In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence is the way complex systems and patterns arise out of a

multiplicity of relatively simple interactions. Emergence is central to the theories of integrative levels and of complex systems. The idea of emergence has been around since at least the time of Aristotle. John Stuart Mill and Julian Huxley are just some of the historical scientists who have written on the concept. The term "emergent" was coined by philosopher G. H. Lewes, who wrote: Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; their sum, when their directions are the same -- their difference, when their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable. It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference. Economist Jeffrey Goldstein provided a current definition of emergence in the journal *Emergence*. Goldstein...

Panpsychism Ludwig Jaskolla 2016-10-03 Recent debates in philosophy of mind seemingly have resulted in an impasse. Reductive physicalism cannot account for the phenomenal mind, and nonreductive physicalism cannot safeguard a causal role for the mental as mental. Dualism was formerly considered to be the only viable alternative, but in addition to exacerbating the problem of mental causation, it is hard to square with a naturalist evolutionary framework. By 1979, Thomas Nagel argued that if reductionism and dualism fail, and a non-reductionist form of strong emergence cannot be made intelligible, then panpsychism—the thesis that mental being is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the universe—might be a viable alternative. But it was not until David Chalmers' *The Conscious Mind* in 1996 that debates on panpsychism entered the philosophical mainstream. Since then the field has been growing rapidly, and some leading philosophers of mind as well as scientist have argued in favor of panpsychism. This book features contemporary arguments for panpsychism as a genuine alternative in analytic philosophy of mind in the 21st century. Different varieties of panpsychism are represented and systematically related to each other in the volume's 16 essays, which feature not only proponents of panpsychism but also prominent critics from both the physicalist and non-physicalist camps.

Mental Causation Thomas Kroedel 2019-12-31 Presents a comprehensive account of how the mind causes things to happen in the physical world. This book is also available as Open Access.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind Brian McLaughlin 2009-01-15 The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind will be an invaluable resource for advanced students and scholars of philosophy, and also for researchers in neighbouring disciplines seeking a high-level survey of the state of the art in this flourishing field.

The Waning of Materialism Robert C. Koons 2010-03-25 Twenty-three philosophers examine the doctrine of materialism find it wanting. The case against materialism comprises arguments from conscious experience, from the unity and identity of the person, from intentionality, mental causation, and knowledge. The contributors include leaders in the fields of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology, who respond ably to the most recent versions and defences of materialism. The modal arguments of Kripke and Chalmers, Jackson's knowledge argument, Kim's exclusion problem, and Burge's anti-individualism all play a part in the building of a powerful cumulative case against the materialist research program. Several papers address the implications of contemporary brain and cognitive research (the psychophysics of color perception, blindsight, and the effects of commissurotomies), adding a posteriori arguments to the classical a priori critique of reductionism. All of the current versions of materialism — reductive and non-reductive, functionalist, eliminativist, and new wave materialism — come under sustained and trenchant attack. In addition, a wide variety of alternatives to the materialist conception of the person receive new and illuminating attention, including anti-materialist versions of naturalism, property dualism, Aristotelian and Thomistic hylomorphism, and non-Cartesian accounts of substance dualism.

Mind in a Physical World Jaegwon Kim 1998 This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind—in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. This book, based on Jaegwon Kim's 1996 Townsend Lectures, presents the philosopher's current views on a variety of issues in the metaphysics of the mind—in particular, the mind-body problem, mental causation, and reductionism. Kim construes the mind-body problem as that of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. Among other points, he redefines the roles of supervenience and emergence in the discussion of the mind-body problem. Arguing that various contemporary accounts of mental causation are inadequate, he offers his own partially reductionist solution on the basis of a novel model of reduction. Retaining the informal tone of the lecture format, the book is clear yet sophisticated.

Mental Causation Jens Harbecke 2013-05-02 This work is a systematic investigation of a range of solutions offered today for the philosophical problem of mental causation. The premises constituting the problem are analyzed before a survey is developed of the most popular theories on mental causation. It is demonstrated in detail why most of these canonical solutions must be considered deficient. In a third part, the 'new compatibilist's' approach to mental causation is explored, which is characterized by assertion of a non-identity-but-non-distinctness principle. The last part aims to offer an alternative solution to the problem. On the basis of a certain set of counterfactual conditionals, which are jointly taken to provide a definition of 'causal proportionality' that improves the existing definitions, it is shown that a specific, and hitherto widely neglected, version of causal overdeterminationism must be considered the most successful solution to the problem of mental causation.

Mental Causation Neil Campbell 2008 How do mental events such as choices and decisions lead to physical action? The problem of mental causation is one of the most important and intriguing philosophical issues of our time and has been at the centre of debates in the philosophy of mind for the past fifty years. In opposition to the recent wave of reductionist theories, this book argues that it is possible to account for mental causation within a nonreductive framework as it adopts a broadly Davidsonian approach to mental causation: reasons cause actions because they are identical to physical events. This work then defends this approach from the frequently raised criticism that it entails epiphenomenalism - the inefficacy of the mental. Moreover, Mental Causation moves beyond Davidson's views by reconsidering the question of whether reasons causally explain actions, arguing in opposition to Davidson, that explanations appealing to reasons represent a distinct category of explanation from causal explanation. Essential reading for anyone interested in debates about mental causation, this is an excellent text for senior undergraduates, graduate students, and professional philosophers.

Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind Simone Gozzano 2008 The ontological debate on the nature of properties is alive as ever. Mainly, they are viewed either as universals or tropes (abstract particulars), an alternative with an immediate impact on what events are taken to be. Although much inquiry in philosophy of mind is done without a full awareness of it, some recent works suggest that the choice may have far-reaching consequences on central topics of this discipline, e.g., token physicalism, multiple realizability, mental causation, perception, introspection, self-awareness. This book explores the extent to which this is true with novel contributions by philosophers who have played a major role in bringing to the fore this interplay of foundational metaphysics and philosophical psychology and by other experts in these fields. Contributors (beside the editors): John Heil (Washington University in St. Louis), Anna-Sofia Maurin (Lund University), E. Jonathan Lowe (University of Durham), David Robb (Davidson College), Ausonio Marras (University of Western Ontario) & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (McGill University).

Mind, Causation and World James E. Tomberlin 1999-02-02 Philosophical Perspectives Volume 11 is an important compilation of articles based on issues surrounding Mind, Causation and World .

A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Jack S. Crumley 2006 A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind is written to engage the beginning student, offering a balanced, accessible entrZe into a notoriously complex field of inquiry. Crumley introduces four core areas in contemporary philosophy of the

mind: the mind/body problem, mental content (intentionality), mental causation, and the nature of consciousness. The book is distinctive in its further coverage of such fascinating topics as the nature of mental images, theories of concepts, and whether or not computers can think, as well as brief accounts of the disciplines with which the philosophy of mind is often associated, among them neuroscience and cognitive psychology.

The Minds of the Moderns Janice Thomas 2014-12-05 This is a comprehensive examination of the ideas of the early modern philosophers on the nature of mind. Taking Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in turn, Janice Thomas presents an authoritative and critical assessment of each of these canonical thinkers' views of the notion of mind. The book examines each philosopher's position on five key topics: the metaphysical character of minds and mental states; the nature and scope of introspection and self-knowledge; the nature of consciousness; the problem of mental causation and the nature of representation and intentionality. The exposition and examination of their positions is informed by present-day debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology so that students get a clear sense of the importance of these philosophers' ideas, many of which continue to define our current notions of the mental. Again and again, philosophers and students alike come back to the great early modern rationalist and empiricist philosophers for instruction and inspiration. Their views on the philosophy of mind are no exception and as Janice Thomas shows they have much to offer contemporary debates. The book is suitable for undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind and the many new courses in philosophy of psychology.

The Philosophy of Mind Brian Beakley 1992 Bringing together the best classical and contemporary writings in the philosophy of mind and organized by topic, this anthology allows readers to follow the development of thinking in five broad problem areas - the mind/body problem, mental causation, associationism/connectionism, mental imagery, and innate ideas - over 2500 years of philosophy. The writings range from Plato and Descartes to Fodor and the PDP research group, showing how many of the current concerns in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are firmly rooted in history. The editors have provided helpful introductions to each of the main sections. Brian Beakley is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Eastern Illinois University. Peter Ludlow is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at SUNY, Stony Brook. Readings from: Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Rene Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, John Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Henry Huxley, William James, Oswald Kulpe, John Watson, Jean Piaget, Gilbert Ryle, U. T. Place, Hilary Putnam, Daniel Dennett, Donald Davidson, Jerry Fodor, Roger Shepard, Jacqueline Metzler, Saul Kripke, Ned Block, Noam Chomsky, Stephen Kosslyn, Zenon Pylyshyn, Patricia Churchland, James McClelland, David Rumelhart, Geoffrey Hinton, Paul Smolensky, Seymour Papert.

Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind Jaegwon Kim 2010-10-21 The first begins with a consideration of Davidson's argument for the claim that there are no strict laws about the mental; the second builds on J.J.C. Smart's observations on biology and its relation to physics; and the third is based on my earlier work on multiple realization.

Personal Agency E. J. Lowe 2008-09-04 Personal Agency consists of two parts. In Part II, a radically libertarian theory of action is defended which combines aspects of agent causalism and volitionism. This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will—a 'two-way' power which rational agents can freely exercise in the light of reason. Lowe contends that substances, not events, are the causal source of all change in the world—with rational, free agents like ourselves having a special place in the causal order as unmoved movers, or initiators of new causal chains. And he defends a thoroughgoing externalism regarding reasons for action, holding these to be mind-independent worldly entities rather than the beliefs and desires of agents. Part I prepares the ground for this theory by undermining the threat presented to it by physicalism. It does this by challenging the causal closure argument for physicalism in all of its forms and by showing that a dualistic philosophy of mind—one which holds that human mental states and their subjects cannot be identified with bodily states and human bodies respectively—is both metaphysically coherent and entirely consistent with known empirical facts.

The Metaphysics of Action David-Hillel Ruben 2018-06-25 In this book, the author provides an account of three central ideas in the philosophy of action: trying to act, acting or doing, and one's action causing further consequences. In all three cases, novel theories of these phenomena are offered: trying to act is not a particular mental or physical act but can be explained using conditionals; that action is not the same as causing something to happen; and in the case of a special but important subset of actions, for example the opening of a window, the action is identical to the event of the window's opening. A result of this last account is that it places actions out in the world, sometimes far removed in time and space from the actor's body. The world is full of action; actions do not just exist in the many little islands of space and time that all of our bodies inhabit. In the final chapter, Ruben describes and discusses a skeptical challenge to the idea that we can ever know whether or not someone else has acted, rather than just passive events having happened to that person.

Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience Bernard Feltz 2019-11 This book aims to show that recent developments in neuroscience permit a defense of free will. Through language, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.

Philosophy of Mind Jaegwon Kim 2010-12-28 The philosophy of mind has long been part of the core philosophy curriculum, and this book is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students, Philosophy of Mind focuses on the mind-body problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The third edition has been thoroughly updated throughout to reflect developments of the past decade, and it is the only text of its kind that provides a serious and respectful treatment of substance dualism. This edition also includes two new chapters on the nature of consciousness and the status of consciousness. Throughout the text, author Jaegwon Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, Kim's emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair, Philosophy of Mind is a model of philosophical exposition and a significant contribution to the field.

Ontology, Modality, and Mind Alexander Carruth 2018-10-11 This book explores a range of traditional and contemporary metaphysical themes that figure in the writings of E. J. Lowe, whose powerful and influential work was still developing at the time of his death in 2015. During his forty-year career, he established himself as one of the world's leading philosophers, publishing eleven single-authored books and well over two hundred essays. His scholarship was strikingly broad, ranging from early modern philosophy to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. His most important and sustained contributions were to philosophy of mind, philosophical logic, and above all metaphysics. E. J. Lowe was committed to a systematic, realist, and scientifically informed neo-Aristotelean approach to philosophy. This volume presents a set of new essays by philosophers who share this commitment, addressing interrelated themes of his work. In particular, these papers focus upon three closely connected topics central not only to Lowe's work, but to contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind in general: ontology and categories of being; essence and modality, and the metaphysics of mental causation.

Physical Realization Sydney Shoemaker 2007-07-19 In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of realization, one which allows the realized properties to be causally efficacious. He also explores the implications of this account for a wide range of metaphysical issues, including the nature of persistence through time, the problem of material constitution, the possibility of emergent properties, and the nature of phenomenal consciousness.

Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations Wim de Muijnck 2013-03-09 This work covers, in its subsequent parts, ontology, the metaphysics of causation, and the philosophy of mind. It provides a firm theoretical basis for believing that in our all-physical world mental causation is perfectly real, and that it can be understood.